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THE RESCRIPTS OF THE EMPEROR PROBUS (276-282 A.D.)
ALAN WATSON*
Scholars tend to date the onset of the "post-classical period" of
Roman law to 235 A.D., the year when the Emperor Alexander
Severus was murdered by his troops. The line of great jurists had
just about come to an end-Ulpian had been murdered by the
mutinous Praetorians in 223-and for the next fifty years, until
the accession of Diocletian, the Empire was in a state of chaos.
The post-classical period itself divides neatly into eras: early
post-classical (or epiclassic as F. Wieacker suggests1 ), Diocletianic,
Constantinian, and so on, right up to the time of Justinian. One
thing these eras have in common is relative neglect by modern
legal historians. Yet, they have a charm and fascination of their
own. The charm is that, for the first time in Roman law, we have
primarily to study texts that we know concerned real people and
2
real situations; the sources, almost entirely imperial rescripts,
reflect the immediate practical concerns of the addressees, not the
interests of the jurists. The fascination lies not only in observing
the changes in legal institutions as people react to new social,
political, economic, and religious pressures, but, above all, in tracing
the growth of state interference with personal relations and dealings. A change takes place that has suggestive parallels with Britain
and elsewhere in the 19th and 20th centuries.
In an earlier study,3 I examined the private law in the rescripts
of Carus and his two sons, the Emperors who ruled from 282 to
284, immediately before the accession of Diocletian, and found as
the main conclusion that, despite everything, the quality of legal
decision had remained reasonably high. This paper considers the
four rescripts that survive from the troubled reign of the preceding
Emperor, Probus. Probus was pushed to the fore by Syria and
Egypt in 276 after the murder by his troops (or death induced by
threats) of the Emperor Tacitus, and he outmanoeuvered Florianus,
who was favoured by the rest of the Empire. Probus was accepted
as Emperor when Florianus was put to death by his own soldiers
* Professor of Civil Law, University of Edinburgh. M.A. 1954, LL.B. 1957,
University of Glasgow; M.A. 1958, D. Phil. 1960, D.C.L. 1973, University of

Oxford.
1 Wieacker, Le Droit romain de la Mort d'Alexandr'e S v re & I' Avgnement

de Dioclftien (235-284 apr. J.-C.), 49 Revue Historique de Droit frangais et
6tranger 201, 223 (1971). That article is mainly devoted to an examination

of the rescripts of Gordian (238-244).
2 For Egypt one must add the papyri.
3 Watson, PrivateLaw in the Rescripts of Carus, Carinus and Numerianus,
41 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 19 (1973).
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in the autumn of that year. After a reign marked by much fighting
against internal and external enemies, Probus was-inevitably it
seems-killed by his own men in 282.
Surprisingly, through all the chaos in the half century after
235, the imperial chancellery continued its work.
The first rescript of Probus, addressed to a man named Fortunatus, has survived without a date.
C. 5.4.9. Si vicinis vel aliis scientibus uxorem liberorun
procreandorum causa domi habuisti et ex eo matrimonio
filia suscepta est, quamvis neque nuptiales tabulae neque
ad natam filiam pertinentes factae sunt, non ideo minus
veritas matrimonii aut susceptae filiae suam habet potestatem.
If, with the knowledge of neighbours or other persons, you
had at home a wife for the sake of procreating children, and
from that marriage a daughter was recognised by you, then
although no relevant documents were drawn up for the
marriage or for the birth of your daughter, none the less
the truth about your marriage or the daughter you recognised has its full validity.
This is one of numerous post-classical rescripts on marriage, and
is primarily concerned with the very existence of and evidence for
the marriage of Fortunatus. The text tells us that no written document was drawn up attesting the marriage, and while we are left
in no doubt that such a document was legally unnecessary, it is
evident that such documents were common. Fortunatus' worries as
to the validity of his marriage and the status of his daughter are
obviously caused by the non-existence of documents. It also emerges
that at this time, as in classical law, no religious or civil ceremony
was needed to mark the wedding; from the silence of the text we
might even deduce-with only slight hesitation-that there had
been no ceremony since otherwise it would have provided valuable
evidence of the parties' intentions. What was important 4 in classical law and later for the beginning of marriage was that the woman
be taken to the man's home, 5 and there is some indication of this in
the word domi, "at home." Yet, though this taking home was of
great significance, it was not sufficient to distinguish marriage
from concubinage. The former also required affectus maritalis,
the intention to be married. The chancellery emphasises this requirement by declaring that if Fortunatus had a wife with the
intention of procreating children, then the union was marriage.
4 At least where the wedding was inter absentes, the deductio in domum
was essential. Another early post-classical rescript, from the reign of Aurelian,
C. 5.3.6, shows that where, as usual, the wedding was inter praesentes,marriage
was considered to begin when the bride was in the bridegroom's house.
5 Cf., e.g., P. Corbett, The Roman Law of Marriage 95 (1930).
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This phrasing is reasonable and in no way unfavourable since
Fortunatus wishes the union-from which he has a daughter-to
be recognised as marriage.6
More interesting is the question of evidence. Something more
than the unsupported statement of the man is wanted, yet there is
no document and apparently no ceremony. Knowledge of neighbours
or other people of how the palties regarded themselves is sufficient
for the purpose. It is the mental attitude behind decisions of this
kind that opens the way to the much later (and non-Roman) constitution of marriage "by habit and repute."
Fortunatus is also concerned about the status of the daughter
whom he had accepted as his. Again, her status had not been recorded in a document, 7 but he is given reassurance.8
To judge from the tense habuisti, "you had a wife at home,"
Fortunatus' wife is dead. In this case it is most likely that Fortunatus will have wanted the marriage to be established to avoid
some of the disabilities that were imposed on the unmarried and
childless. 9

There is nothing surprising in the legal decision-no derogation
from classical standards, no post-classical innovation. Most striking
is the rescript's banality. Why should anyone need an imperial
rescript on this point? Indeed, how could anyone at that period
enter a marriage with no ceremony or celebration, no formalities
or writing? If the bride had brought the bridegroom a dowry,
the amount, terms, and conditions must also have been unrecorded
in writing. The answer can only be that Fortunatus, although a
Roman citizen, was of the lowlier classes. Legal advice at the highest level was not restricted to the rich and powerful.
A second rescript dates from 280 and is addressed to a woman
Massicia.
6 Interestingly, in the Republic the censors took an oath from certain
citizens at least that they would have a wife for the sake of procreating
children. Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 4.3.2., 17.21.44.
7 For a discussion of these documents see F. Lanfranchi, Ricerche sul
valore giuridico delle dichiarazioni di nascita in diritto romano (1951).
8 S. Solazzi considers there are interpolations in the rescript, and above
all that there was no reference to a daughter or to other people, apart from
neighbours, being aware of the existence of the marriage. Solazzi, Pater est
quem nuptiae demonstrant, 7 IURA 131, 136 (1956). But he seems overcritical. He feels that the chancellery would not have written "aut susceptae
filiae" but "et susceptae filiae" if her status had been in question. But the use
of "aut" seems perfectly natural. And he seems to take "vel aliis" as referring
to malicious persons, gossips and such like. But if alii are called upon, it is
people who know the situation and who can testify to the ezistence of the
marriage.
9 See, e.g., W. Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to
Justinian 292 et seq. (3d ed. P. Stein 1963).
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C. 8.53.4. Si functiones per eum, cui donata res non erat,
vel ab actoribus ipsius nomine celebratae sunt, tibi obesse
non potest.
If the taxes on a thing were paid by a person to whom the
thing had not been given, or by agents acting in his name,
this fact can not cause you harm.
The rescript also appears in the Fragmenta Vaticana 288, which
reveals that originally it was considerably longer. Sadly, Fr. Vat.
288 itself is in a very fragmentary state and cannot be reconstructed with any degree of certainty, 0 but it does fill in the background. It appears that Massicia had intended to make a gift-quite
possibly there was even a document relating the gift"-but the gift
was never completed, and she remained owner of the thing in
question. The "donee" either personally or through his agents paid
the taxes (functiones) on the thing in his own name and Probus
2
reassures Massicia that this act is not prejudicial to her.
In this instance too, there is little to be said about the law in
the case. As in classical law, so in this rescript, there was no complete gift until the donor transferred the thing by physical delivery.13 Until the gift was complete, he or she had a perfect legal
right to change his mind. Likewise, a non-owner did not become
owner (or affect the real owner's title) by acting as if he were the
owner.
But the text falls neatly into the post-classical social scene in
two ways. First, the rescript is one of several-the third rescript
of Probus is another-that concern a gift where the donor changed
his mind, either before the gift was complete or, too late, after the
gift had been made. 14 The whole topic of gift, in fact, has an unexpected prominence in the post-classical sources. Indeed, in what
is in effect the preamble to his famous constitution of 316 A.D.
10 For very different reconstructions see 2 J. Baviera, Fontes Iuris Romani
Antejustiniani 526 (2d ed. 1964) ; P. Girard & F. Senn, Textes de droit romain
533 (7th ed. 1967) ; E. Huschke, Iurisprudentiae Auteiustinianae quae supersunt 798 (5th ed. 1886). In the sixth edition of Huschke, most of the gaps in

the text are left unreconstructed. 2 E. Huschke, Iurisprudentiae Auteiustinianae
quae supersunt 304 (6th ed. E. Seckel & B. Kiibler 1927).
1 The text is too fragmentary for us to establish the r8le of this document.
C. 8.53.1, which is dated 210 A.D., allows transfer of ownership by delivery
of a document without a corresponding delivery of the thing, but the almost
universal opinion of modern scholars is that this rescript, as it stands, cannot

give the law of that period (or even of Justinian). Cf., e.g., 2 M. Kaser, Das
r mische Privatrecht 203, n.68 (1959); E. Levy, West Roman Vulgar Law
146-48 (1951).
12 S. Riccobono regards the rescript in C. 8.53.(54).4 as interpolated by

Justinian and would delete the "non." Riccobono, TTaditio flota, 33 Zeitschrift
der Savigny Stiftung 259, 290-92 (1912).
13 Or bound himself by a contract such as stipulatio.
14 There seem to be six further instances of "repentance" before Diocletian:

C. 5.16.11, 8.55(56).1, 8.55(56).2, 8.55(56).3, 9.34.2; Fr. Vat. 272.
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reforming the law of gift, the Emperor Constantine declares he
has investigated many actions arising from gifts, and he enumerates as one of the causes of the disputes, incomplete gifts being
taken as perfected, "inchoat pro perfectis . . . controversiam
faciant."'15 Secondly, as is the case with many rescripts, the addressee is a woman. It would appear that they had as much right
as men to approach the Emperor for a legal opinion, and that many
were fully active in looking after their interests.
The third rescript, from the year 277, is addressed to one Felix.
C. 8.55(56).2. Si apud provinciae praesidem aviam filiae
tuae quasi paenitentia ductam subtracta instrumenta donationum igni exussisse constiterit, vereri te non oportet,
ne id, quod iure vires acceperat, ex post facto possit in
dubium revocari.
If it was established in front of the provincial governor
that the grandmother of your daughter, guided by a change
of heart as it were, took back the documents of gifts and
burned them, you need not fear that what had achieved
legal efficacy can be rendered doubtful by subsequent conduct.
The basic point of the rescript is plain: a validly made gift
cannot be revoked by subsequent behaviour of a donor who has
changed his mind. In all probability the rescript has been shortened: a gift of a physical thing to be complete required that there
be delivery of the thing. Nothing is said about delivery in the rescript as it stands, and it is reasonable to think that some reference
to delivery has been cut out for the sake of brevity. The point,
however, is not very material.
What is important, though, is what the rescript reveals about
the mistaken views of non-lawyers on the state of the law. A gift
required no writing and, indeed, writing had no role to play in the
substantive law. (In practice, however, a written document might
serve as some evidence that a gift had been made, though the
sources stress that a document, even one filed with a public office,
did not mean there was a gift unless delivery had occurred. 16
Certainly, however, the document would reveal the donor's intention to make a gift.) Yet, here we have a grandmother who had
made gifts tearing up the relevant documents obviously with the
intention to revoke. Presumably, she was under the impression
that the documents were important for the efficacy of the gifts.
15 Fr. Vat. 249. The constitution is repeated (with alterations) in C. Th.
8.12.1 and C. 8.53.25, but in these versions the preamble has been excised.
16 Cf., e.g., Fr. Vat. 263, 266a, 268, 285, 297; D. 41.2.48 (Papinian 10
lresp.),
6.1.77 (Ulpian 17 ad ed.).
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The fourth rescript is addressed to Octavianus in 278.
C. 2.16(17).1. Saepe rescriptum est ante sententiam signa
rebus, quas aliquis [alius-Mommsen] tenebat, imprimi non
oportere. et ideo ea rebus aut fructibus apud te constitutis
illicite imposita poteris ipse licite detrahere, ut amotis his
causa, quae ex officio tibi infertur, terminetur.
It has often been laid down by rescript that, before a legal
decision, it is not proper to set seals on things which another
person was holding. Hence when seals were illegally placed
on things or their fruits which had been placed in your
keeping, you can lawfully remove the seals, so that when
they have been removed, the action which is brought against
you by public officials may come to an end.
This is one of only two rescripts in the title of the Code, 2.16(17),
concerned with the proposition that no one, without the authority
of a judge, should place seals on things that another person has
under his control. The other rescript is rather later, from the reign
of Diocletian. The opening clause of our rescript, however, shows
that it was by no means the first on the subject..7
The precise situation confronting Octavianus cannot be wholly
reconstructed. It is possibly safe to assume that the rescript in its
present guise has been rather generalised to give it wider applicability. However that may be, the general situation is plain.
Octavianus had been given custody of property of which he was
not owner. 18 Another person-probably the owner or someone who
claimed real rights over the property--set his seal upon the objects
in question, although Octavianus claims that he had no judicial
decision to support this behaviour. Exactly what real right was
being claimed by this party cannot be established since the act of
sealing did not amount to a claim of any particular title.19 In any
event, the effect of the presence of the seals on the property was
to make it appear that Octavianus had no right to physical custody,
and public officials then brought an action against Octavianus,
presumably to make him give up control. Octavianus asked the
Emperor for a ruling and was, of course, told that since the seals
had been affixed unlawfully he could simply remove them, and this
would bring the official action against him to an end.
17

It was common for a rescript to claim support from the fact that the

same proposition had also been laid down in earlier rescripts.
18

This appears from the use of the word "constitutis," which would be

oddly used if Octavianus had control of property which he owned.
'9 Thus, in C. 2.16(17).2 it is envisaged that the person who sets his seal
improperly on property held by another might be the owner or the pledge

creditor. For other instances of sealing see the texts referred to in the entries
signo and signum in 5 Vocabularium Iurisprudentiae Romanae 543 et seq.
(1939).

HeinOnline -- 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1127 1973-1974

1128

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

The purpose behind the legal rule is to avoid self-help: a person
who believes he has a legal right to a thing must not take steps to
assert his control until he has a judgement in his favour. Rulings
of such kind are prominent at all periods of Roman law. Of great
interest is the reason Octavianus wishes the rescript, namely to
bring to a close a certain mode of conduct by state officials. Examination of post-classical rescripts shows this to be a very common
purpose, whether or not it is alleged that the conduct of the officials
is improper.
These, then, are the surviving rescripts of the Emperor Probus.
None contains a great legal innovation; none shows a drastic lowering of legal standards. Their importance lies in what they reveal
about general matters. Despite the enormous military and economic
problems of the age, the imperial chancellery functioned; rescripts
were issued to the most ordinary individuals, men and women
alike. There was no need for a rescript to be concerned with an
important principle or difficult point of law. Whereas the classical
jurists write as if they were concerned only with law at Rome itself,
the rescripts show the practical realities: one of them, C. 8.55 (56) .2,
with its mention of the provinciae praeses was obviously addressed
to a person in a province, and it is probable that others, even all of
them, were too. What is possibly most revealing of all is that every
one of them is saying in effect that "lawyers' formalities" are not
conclusive or are not effective in law, that truth is to prevail over
writing or acts. 2 0
20 1 am grateful to Professor A.M. Honor6 for his comments on a draft
of this paper. Honord's own paper on the making and authorship of early
post-classical rescripts, which will appear in 3 Aufstieg und Niedergang der
r6mischen Welt (H. Temporini ed.), will be fundamental for all future
research.
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